'Appropriate'. Such a teacherly word, designed for erratic teens to hold back the hormone bounce that makes them use their hands either to feel or hit.
When something is 'appropriated', it's taken away. If you are a 'proprietor', you own something, have legal status to possession.
So reigning in 'the kids' means not only helping them avoid trespass mistakes, violations of others' bodies and sense of 'space', but it means alerting them (at least implicitly) to an exercise of Power Above Them.
A reinforcement of the yet more primal 'family drama' where true helplessness simply mistakes even benign physical activity for threat.
When does Nature, when does Society, relax control? Do we ever get to develop ourselves without interference, however well-intended, that chokes us, early, off?
If time doesn't really 'exist', but finds its measure from us, only us, so far as we know, by extension from the beating heart of our body; and the universe is known to us, only us, so far as we know, through our brain organ and its genetically-set structural limits,
Then can we not adopt an 'idealist' view (of someone's fashioning) that all our (yes, admittedly limited) knowledge of things 'external' -- which would include not only external to the body, but also external to the activities of the mind as it operates as part of/through the agency of the brain, thus 'external to' but within the body -- that all such knowledge is creative, a function of mind-play, a product of imagination?
What status, then, of 'the body' that houses a beating heart and agent brain capable of mind-play? Is that foundational 'place' just a metaphor for the productive locus we call more closely 'self'?
Are we in that scheme a kind of demiurgic impulse whose energy derives from a yet more initiatory source?
Are we, ourselves, imagined in turn?
As judges and engineers, poets, of what goes from potential into actual.
If Buddhist practice means learning to see through what is right there as 'simply phenomenal', passing, and not to be 'attached to' as though its metaphysical status were fixed and 'concrete', an object wheedling emotional address,
Then its spiritual opposite must be 'forecasting' of any kind, attempts to harden what isn't even yet happening, but is only hinted at as a possible futurity, 'reifying' the conditional into an object that causes expectation -- either fearful anxiety or premature joy, squeezing emotion from a 'reality' that by anyone's account cannot possibly be there.
Good bye economics and weather reports, just for a start.
If there was one theoretical force pushing a sense of universal economic well-being, it was Marxism.
These words come from someone quite aware of the advantages in capitalist economics, of the favorable fall-out from growth, advantages in expanding markets, minimal interference with what men contract to do. To the extent those relationships can be explained, they are 'rational'.
Marxism thought the moment had come when such economic craft could serve all equally, and would be the vehicle for an economically egalitarian society.
Why did it fail? Here are some possible, though short, answers:
1) It was misapplied. The USSR and its clones simply couldn't pull it off.
2) In being applied, surprise implications came to the surface. An egalitarian society, might, for instance, hold low what otherwise might show as 'excellent', and might simply let rise or insist on making rise what gives 'best lipservice'.
3) After being applied, its incompleteness appeared. Institutions thought to be extraneous 'superstructures' of the old guard actually had continuing -- and vital -- use. Point to viable parliamentary systems or to religious 'support systems'.
4) It was never applied. The conditions Marx and company thought were needed have never come into being at the crucial level.
Easy enough in the comfortable West (and its emulators in other parts of the global geography) to give commies the old 'Bronx cheer' -- so many of them were apparatchiks or butchers, manipulators or hypocrites, cynics or self-protecting survivors.
Too easy, also, to conclude that the older, 'tried-and-true', ways are proven-out. Those who wave Adam Smith's The Wealth Of Nations as though it were a true 'little red book' of foundational wisdom may be able to explain many economic relationships in a rational way. They cannot, with any good conscience, explain economic activity itself as rational. What's done by men (inclusive, here, to include women, of course) always must be read as having an undercurrent of the irrational in it.
Even the rational compromises represented by bargains and contracts and the legal rules protecting them must implicitly allow for motives that are unspoken, for the irregular and not always stable psychological development of individuals, for the cultural routines, traditional and seemingly arbitrary, of human place, for social allegiances (like family, clan, race, etc) that structurally trump any particular economic agreement. All those work under the surface of all transactions. The transactions are only so good as the . . . shifting irrationality (?) . . . allows.
Any theory must account for the irrational. Is that possible?
Killing time waiting to administer an exam in four minutes.
Against the window which reflects the interior of the room, one looks to the exterior where it rains and rains heavily.
Some hooded people singly march toward a lit building. A clock tower shows 2 minutes to go. Flat, concrete demi-walls, continuing to be slickened, shine-back the campus walkway lamps.
'Structural recognition'. A pattern of electric lighting/reflection/window/transparency/snugness/rain. This pattern's an early one, and strong. An emotion from 'then' whenever 'then' was. Visceral.
Time not really 'here' anymore.
Not dejà vu, something different. One is losing the immediate moment, not 're-living' one. An overlay of one moment by another, suspending the experience, replenishing its power, keeping its feeling as a template to let motivate, later, art.
Looking at me while propping her foot against the women's restroom door and fumbling for a switch: Do you know where the lights are in here? Following my point behind her shoulder at the corner of the entry, she adds: I was peeing in the dark. Laughing politely, I. Then, as an afterthought Not necessarily an unpleasant thing to do, I add, making my own way into the men's.
And when the Prince opened his eyes and went where the coffee was made, lo! The White Swan in his dream had been right!
Before him lay two bilious puddles of hairball.
The Prince, addressing Black Cat and Orange Cat, looking one to another, said, What has gone on here? Which one of you is to blame for this?
But The White Swan proved right a second time. Both cats, the black and the orange, could no longer speak! Moving their jaws and curling their tongues, the only sounds that came were a yawn from one and a squeak from the other.
Cursed dream come true! This is how cats came to meow and rrrhhrrrhh and chhchhchh and can no longer tell us which kibble they prefer.
And it is also one more example of how dreams cause reality to change.
That scene in Whit Stillman's Barcelona where the naval lieutenant Fred, the jingoistic East-Coast Establishmentarian, the yuppified 'ugly American', ponders whether an upper lip is more effectively shaven with the grain of mustache or against it.
An analytic statement is one true by virtue of its definition: 'I am who I am', 'elephants are animals with trunks' -- these are self-evident.
A synthetic statement is one not true by virtue of definition: 'I am a man 1.82 meters in height', 'Sheba is an elephant in the Atlanta zoo' -- these require evidence.
But, you know, even 'self-evidence' based on definitional grounds requires a knowledge of the world which implies having had empirical dealings with it.
Apparently, I've stumbled on a W.V.O. Quine challenge made against logical positivist arguments which put too much reliance on analytic statements to establish truth and downplayed the role of synthetic statements.
In doing so, Quine was in effect defending the availability of truth founded in fact rather than simply in definition, language, and meaning.
(I have no idea whether this is right, but it sounds good.)